este é um projeto paralelo que as vezes esbarra com a ontologia das potências. e quando esbarra as vezes cospe na cara, as vezes é xodó:
Propositions as small announcements
Or, the metaphysics of indefinite descriptions
Car si le plan de consistence n’a pour contenu que dês heccéités, il a aussi toute une sémiotique particulère qui lui sert d’expression. [...] Cette sémiotique est surtout composée de noms propres, de verbes à l’infinitif et d’articles ou de pronons indéfinis. [...] Em troisième lieu, l’article et le pronon indéfinis ne sont pas des indetermines [...] ils ne manquent de rien lorsquíls introducent des heccéités, des evenement don’t l’individuation ne passe pas par une forme et ne se fait pas par un sujet. Alors l’indefini se conjugue avec le maximum de determination: il était une fois, on bat un enfant, un cheval tombe… […] C’est pourquoi nous nous étonnons devant les efforts de la psychanalyse qui veut a tout prix que, dernière les indéfinis, il y a un défini cache, un possessif, un personnel: quand l’enfant dit <
Deleuze & Guattari, 1980, p. 322-4
How can an indefinite description – rather than a definite one or, rather, a Russellian proper name[1] - be the best expression in language and thought of a singularity? Other expressions are considered to have the capacity to depict individual objects and bring them to the fore. Russellian proper names, for example, are expressions that allow de re thought about particular objects – where roughly defined borders are available, even when unbeknown to the thinker. The singularity depicted by a name (or definite description in referential use[2], or another expression rigidified[3]) is in some sense inanimate even though it could be animated by properties and relations. What the expression of singularity depicts is often a substratum that is fixed, inanimate and indifferent to its properties.
When singularities are not objects but rather powers or events, another kind of expression could be on demand. Singularities become what happen to things, instead of being bearers of properties and relations (and events) – singular is what happens, not what grounds many happenings. properties and powers are pin to. When we move from an ontology of singular objects to an ontology of singular transitions, we need a suitable change in our expression of singularities – they ought to express that feature of singular free-floating elements.
When discussing the transferability of power tropes, Molnar (2003: 43-44) considers a view he calls non-ownership trope-theory according to which tropes have no bearers – it an ontology of properties with nothing but bundles of properties (and relations). Tropes would be floating in bundles with no substratum to rely on – no grounding object to be underneath whatever happens. Molnar sets this view aside by considering it a version of Platonism: “It allows the existence of properties without bearers just as Platonism allows universals not instantiated in any object.” Such a trope theory is not relevantly akin to Platonism as it postulates no universals and could not conceive of objects bearing them. Non-ownership trope theory is an ontology where singular items are floating powers: a metaphysics of indeterminacy. Indefinite propositions are therefore the basis for a metaphysics of the indefinite, borderless, vague and yet singular.
Niciun comentariu:
Trimiteți un comentariu